What is "Government"?

@1phd writes/tweets:
"@Darjeelingzen u know, if govt's so bad, Y didn't Iraq&Libya just automatically b magically happy places when govt was torn down? @tokyo_tom"





As I often apply a critical lens to institutions of domination (power-over-others), the question is not lost on some observers, that if criticisms of the State (government without unanimity of consensus) were well founded, then why are territories ruled by powerful States sometimes places of relative safety and wealth (such as the "the United States of America" or "the United Kingdom"), whereas regions with weak central institutions of domination ("Somalia", "Afghanistan") are places of relative danger and poverty?

The question is, at least at first glance, very logical: if the State is bad, then why is it that places with a powerful State can be relatively prosperous and safe, while places with no State or at most a very weak State are relatively modest and risky?

I would suggest that for any reasoned response to the question to take place we must define and clarify the fundamental elements; most importantly, a definition of "government" must be established.

What is "government"? How is "government" different from Walmart? How is government different from a church or synagogue? What are the essential differences between "government" and other institutions?

When the sociologist Max Weber asked the question, "What do we mean by politics?" His reply was, "...we wish to understand by politics only the leadership, or the influencing, of a political association, hence today, of a state..." And Weber's identification of the essential difference of the State from all other sociological institutions, "[the State is] a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."

I accept Weber's identification; for what is "government" in its essential nature, other than the institutionalization of power-over-others to compel obedience? But are there other social institutions which also have this feature? Are there other social institutions which also share the institutionalization of force/domination over a given territory?

Augustine, in his book City of God, wrote this:
"Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of cities, and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity. Indeed, that was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who had been seized. For when that king had asked the man what he meant by keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold pride, What you mean by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with a petty ship, I am called a robber, while you who does it with a great fleet are styled emperor."

I also accept Augustine's identification, that bands of robbers, pirates, and other criminal syndicates, also share the same essential element as does the State or "governments" which are not based in continuous unanimous-consensus. These criminal-syndicates, like every State or State-governments, also attempt to claim control of a given territory via means of force, coercion and/or expropriation. The means employed being the same, the difference between an emperor and a pirate is only in the degree of success.

With this understanding of terms and identification of essential qualities, I believe it would now become clear why Somalia and Afghanistan are places of poverty and danger; it is not because they have too little government, but because they have too much! Every petty robber, institutes his own brand of government on others, and with so many petty governments every where, the people have no safety, and no predictability as to when petty government might attack or rob them, that to become economically productive is to only make one's self a target of a petty government and therefore there is a disincentive to productivity.

Just because a person with in the territory claimed by the corporate institution of "the United States of America" has less government to trouble herself with than does a person in Somalia, is no cause for that person to be thankful that the robber that claims her as a serf or victim, is a greater and grander tyrant preventing so many minor and petty robbers as a person may have in Somalia.

Rather than have a institutionalization of robbers and criminal-syndicates, I would suggest that it would be preferable for all persons to interact in voluntary/consensual ways. It would be preferable to dispense with instituting power-over-others and rather to cooperate having power-with-others. I suggest that peace is preferable to violence; that possessions are preferable to robberies; that cooperation is preferable to domination.

Madison: The Law

"It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their own choice if the laws be...so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow." ~James Madison

Mises: Action Axiom

"Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego's meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person's conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life. Such paraphrases may clarify the definition given and prevent possible misinterpretations. But the definition itself is adequate and does not need complement of commentary."[1]


I might phrase the action axiom this way: the concept of "action" is a useful lens by which to describe the phenomenon of experience; the concept of "action" presumes that a subject acts with purposes in mind; that action presumes a subject selecting from possible action-means, to achieve an end preferred by the subject.

Just as the geometrical definition of a triangle, may at first glance seem unimpressive but when deductive reason reveals the implications of the Pythagorean theorem, the seemingly simple definition reveals itself to have impressive implications. In the same way, the recognition of the definition of action as purposeful behavior which presumes that a subject acts as a means to achieve and end/purpose, this simplistic definition can reveal such implications such as: persons engage in economic trade/exchange, so as to meet their predicted preferred end-state/outcome, therefore every consensual/voluntary exchange takes place because both person expect to be benefitted from the exchange and that both parties may benefit from the exchange because they each have slight to extreme differences in their subjective valuation of what they give in exchange versus what they receive in exchange.


To say that, "Bob acts to mow his lawn by pushing a reel-mower, in order that Bob may achieve his preferred end-state, which is a mowed lawn.", is more meaningful than, "Hominid known as 'Bob' exhibits behaviors in such a way, such that he pushes a mechanical device around an area of short grass and one can observe that that in this process, some of the short grass is shortened."

This later analysis, rejecting action as purposeful behavior, must see only behaviors without purpose; behaviors just *are* and may have no reason or meaningful causes or purposes. The later analysis may be seen as less meaningful, because the observer of Bob exhibiting behavior, is herself only exhibiting behavior; which is to say, that without the lens of action as purposeful behavior, then the scientist making observations does not do so for any rational purpose but the scientist herself is only exhibiting behavior.

The Means of Production

What is the "means of production" other than those means by which goods are produced?  Can any goods be produced without any labor inputs?  Even a machine which automates some of the production processes, requires labor inputs to produce the machine, to maintain and repair the machine, as well as labor inputs to feed the machine raw-materials (those materials themselves requiring labor-inputs).

I therefore conclude that labor is a necessary condition for production to take place; which is to say, without labor, no production is possible.

If no production is possible without labor, then labor is the primary means of production; it is the mode by which production is possible.

For labor to take place, a mind or consciousness must direct the body to act in meaningful and purposeful ways; therefore without mind/consciousness, no labor is possible and therefore the mind/consciousness is likewise, the means of labor.

The mind directs labor in purposeful action, in order to satisfy human-needs, either for one's self or for the needs of others in gift or exchange for the products of labor of others.

Therefore, each individual, possessing a mind and a body by implication of their mind directing their action in labor to satisfy needs, possesses in themselves the [primary] means of production.  Through these means, they may fashion labor-saving devices in order to increase either their production or their recreation; these additional but secondary or tertiary means of production may become increasingly complex but they all fundamentally proceed from the individual's control or possession of their own body by their consciousness.

Therefore, all persons by their minds' control of their bodies, possessed to the exclusion of others, the means of production.

Simon: Guns & Government

"If you would not confront your neighbor and demand his money at the point of a gun to solve every new problem that may appear in your life, you should not allow the government to do it for you." - William E. Simon

Hodgskin: Education

"The education of a free people, like their property, will always be directed more beneficially for them when it is in their own hands. When government interferes, it directs its efforts more to make people obedient and docile than wise and happy. It devises to control the thoughts, and fashion even the minds of its subjects; and to give into its hands the power of educating the people is the widest possible extension of that most pernicious practice which has so long desolated society, of allowing one or a few men to direct the actions, and control the conduct of millions. Men had better be without education—properly so called, for nature of herself teaches us many valuable truths—than be educated by their rulers; for then education is but the mere breaking in of the steer to the yoke; the mere discipline of a hunting dog, which, by dint of severity, is made to forego the strongest impulse of nature, and instead of devouring his prey, to hasten with it to the feet of his master."


Thomas Hodgskin

Voting

    I approach the subject of voting this way; it is not an effective use of my energy or time to affect for myself the value of autonomy/satisfaction I would desire for myself.  I appreciate that there is some desire to "put an end to the voting debate" and I would share the desire to "put an end to" institutions of domination, yet I feel that to concentrate energies on moral arguments for why voting might be considered to be immoral, would be less root-striking as the pursuit of other avenues for discussion.  I would like to draw attention to the idea, that I do not think an adequate argument can be made to say that voting is *malum in se* or bad-in-itself, as many voluntary/consensual associations may use voting as an agreed upon strategy for arriving at a conclusion as to how to take action as a group; for instance a golf-club may decide by a vote where to hold their next tournament.  I reason therefore that if voting is not malum in se, then it is not that voting, in and of itself, is immoral, but that particular qualities/features of the political institutions that use voting as a method at arriving at particular conclusions as to how to make decisions, that is really at issue.  I further reason that the difference between political institutions and private/voluntary associations, is the ability to extricate (opt-out) one's self the group's decision that is the critical quality/feature that is at issue; if one could extricate one's self from a political institution's decisions/actions then this would remedy the moral/ethical problem; if one could say, "I elect to extricate myself from this political institution because I do not consent to be governed by those rules" and if that decision to extricate was respected by others (particularly the enforcers) then I would conclude that the moral/ethical problem of political domination would be remedied.  However, since this is not the case that an individual's choice to extricate from the rules of the political institution (unless one was to physically remove one's self from the territories claimed to be controlled/owned by the political institution) then there is no such complete remedy to the domination of political institutions.
    Therefore, I conclude that voting, in and of itself, is not immoral and unethical but rather it is the standing threat of force/violence/aggression to compel obedience to political decisions regardless of an individual's lack-of/withdrawal-of consent which is the more pertinent issue.

    If the NAP is considered to be satisfactory guide to ethical behavior, then I believe we may immediate dispense with the possibility that voting consists of either direct initiation of force or theft; therefore only the possibility that voting consists of coercion remains.  Coercion implies the reasonable threat of force; the question then may be framed as, "does the voter, through the action of voting, imply a reasonable threat of force?".  I question the validity of the interpretation of voting as coercion; if a criminal syndicate, such as the mafia or yakuza  were to permit their victims of extortion and coercion, the opportunity to "vote" for one of two mafia/yakuza bosses, is it the victim that participates in this election the person who has initiated coercion/a-reasonable-threat-of-violence against her fellows or is it the bosses/enforcers of the criminal syndicate? Perhaps the issue can be made more clear by the question, if one has the right to defend one's self from the initiations of force, coercion or theft, then does the voluntaryist have the right to stand at the polls and employ "self-defense" to prevent others from voting? If not, why not?

    Some have argued that the act of voting is an act that implies that an individual willingly consents to be governed by the processes instituting the election.  However, there is no evidence that would necessitate this conclusion by the act of voting alone; certainly a particular individual may support and advocate for the current political system and this person may choose to vote, while it is also certainly possible for a person, who in every way detests the institution of domination on principle, might choose to invest a small amount of time and energy on the infinitesimally small chance, that her individual participation in the electoral process may mitigate the possible damage that may occur to her in the future.   Take for example, the instance of a street robbery; one man, wielding a knife, demands another man's wallet and makes threatening gestures.  It would not be uncommon for the man being threatened may take his wallet and surrender it to the knife-wielding robber.  Has the man necessarily consented to the robbery by his surrendering of the wallet?  Certainly it is possible, that the man, feeling compassion for the robber, might willingly be gifting his wallet but more likely the act was an act of capitulation in order to mitigate possible damages.  The State stands as a constant and active threat of the initiation of violence if its edicts and dictates are not obeyed; this situation of constant threat of violence creates an quagmire of ethical analysis.  The man confronted by the knife-wielding robber may well be within his rights to stand on principle, and choose to ostracize the robber and refuse to surrender his wallet or have any other dealings with that robber, yet I believe it reasonable to conclude that under the conditions of coercion, it would be ethically acceptable for the man to surrender his wallet to the robber in order to mitigate damages.  Some might argue that voting is different than surrendering the wallet as the act of voting has the possibility of entangling others (in much the same way as using a bomb in self-defense, in such a way that it would endanger innocent bystanders would be ethically prohibitive).  However, the money in the wallet surrendered may also be used to buy a weapon more threatening than the knife and could therefore could similarly entangle others; I would argue that the indirect nature of surrendering the wallet and voting have more in common than the direct nature of using a bomb in self-defense.

   Some have argued that since voting is the election of an agent who will by necessity of an institution of domination, initiate aggression against non-consenting parties, then therefore voting is itself an act of aggression.  However, I reason that this argument fallaciously assumes agency when no such agency is in evidence; the politician can in no way be said to be the agent of those who elected her, as the politician may act against her constituants interests; an agent that works against the interest of her principals is a fraud; an agent who can be foisted upon her principals without their consent is not an agent at all.  In as much as the individual who votes, does not herself determine for herself which person shall act as alleged-agent (the determination is decided by the vote, not by the individual herself), and the individual who votes cannot dismiss her alleged-agent, and that alleged-agent may in fact work against her interests, there is in fact no agency in evidence and therefore the voter does not elect an agent, neither for herself, nor for any others.

   Some have also argued that the act of voting legitimates the system.  I would assume that most persons reading this, already deny the that the current political system has any legitimacy; so therefore, how could the act of voting grant legitimacy to an illegitimate institution of domination?  How can a individual that has no right to initiate aggression on others, ever grant that right to an institution of domination?  How can an individual grant something that the individual does not possess?  I take the position that the individual can not grant rights or powers that they themselves do not possess and therefore, the act of voting could in no way grant the system any additional legitimate rights or powers.

I conclude that voting does not imply individual consent, voting does not employ actual agency, voting does not, in-itself (voting-qua-voting) directly entangle innocent bystanders, and voting cannot grant any legitimacy, rights or powers to the institution of domination.

Voting is merely a political pageant or charade.  It is the means by which the State alleges legitimacy but this allegation is merely marketing or public-relations.  It gives serfs the illusion of empowerment; it sets the serfs up to blame themselves if the institution of domination oppresses them; it sets up conditions for political factions to waste their time and energy fighting amongst themselves while the institution of domination itself is relieved of scrutiny.

Voting may be a farce but I am not convinced that taking part in farces is in and of itself, unethical.