So, in conversation with Andrew Hartwell, it occurred to me to mention the economic theory [Austrian School Economics] employed by most persons identifying themselves under the "Anarcho-Capitalist" banner would suggest that under voluntary market conditions without coercive-institutions in place, we would expect to see a more evenly distributed pattern of "wealth" or satisfaction disbursement.
Not an "Anarcho-Capitalist" myself, but as someone who is keenly interested in Austrian School economic theory, I would like to explore this thesis in discussion with others.
The following includes my original composition of the idea: {"One further note: AnCap economic theory would generally expect to see a much greater equalization of wealth [{edit}: greater disbursement of potential satisfaction, by increased production and decreased ability for coercive-capital accumulation] than we may experience today; that large capital accumulations much less likely to occur in AnCap-ism, except for specific production purposes (taking advantage of economies of scale); the indolent wealthy would be an unlikely occurrence in AnCap society, because there are no barriers to market competition, meaning the appropriation of capital away from capital-production forces for the purposes of enriching a few, would create a less competitive condition for the business that would do so, than those that would use excess capital for reinvestment in factors of production. Each voluntary transaction, having the anticipated effect of benefiting both parties, the AnCap would surmise that those currently in "poverty" would be substantially better off and those that are extraordinarily "wealthy" today would quickly find themselves less competitive under absolute free-market conditions and those "wealthy" would likely become less so; hence the AnCap would expect under voluntary/non-coercive market conditions a much greater distribution of "wealth" or satisfaction."}
"Nowhere and at no time has the large-scale ownership of land come into being through the working of economic forces in the market. It is the result of military and political effort. Founded by violence, it has been upheld by violence and by that alone." Ludwig von Mises
The general questions I expect we will entertain/be-focusing on are as follows:
Why might voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, have a more evenly distribution of "wealth"?
Why might voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, provide for greater "wealth" for those who might be considered to be in "poverty"?
Why might voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, be counter-productive for large-unproductive (not actively employed in processes of production/ i.e. privately owned for personal/non-productive purposes) accumulations of "wealth"?
What are the counter-arguments? Which is to say, for what reasons could we anticipate, greater concentrations of "wealth" in fewer hands?
I'm posting the full discussion we had on Google+ here:
New Topic Thread: Voluntary Exchange Markets and Satisfaction/Wealth/Capital Distributions
So, in conversation with Andrew Hartwell, it occurred to me to mention the economic theory [Austrian School Economics] employed by most persons identifying themselves under the "Anarcho-Capitalist" banner would suggest that under voluntary market conditions without coercive-institutions in place, we would expect to see a more evenly distributed pattern of "wealth" or satisfaction disbursement.
Not an "Anarcho-Capitalist" myself, but as someone who is keenly interested in Austrian School economic theory, I would like to explore this thesis in discussion with others.
The following includes my original composition of the idea: {"One further note: AnCap economic theory would generally expect to see a much greater equalization of wealth [{edit}: greater disbursement of potential satisfaction, by increased production and decreased ability for coercive-capital accumulation] than we may experience today; that large capital accumulations much less likely to occur in AnCap-ism, except for specific production purposes (taking advantage of economies of scale); the indolent wealthy would be an unlikely occurrence in AnCap society, because there are no barriers to market competition, meaning the appropriation of capital away from capital-production forces for the purposes of enriching a few, would create a less competitive condition for the business that would do so, than those that would use excess capital for reinvestment in factors of production. Each voluntary transaction, having the anticipated effect of benefiting both parties, the AnCap would surmise that those currently in "poverty" would be substantially better off and those that are extraordinarily "wealthy" today would quickly find themselves less competitive under absolute free-market conditions and those "wealthy" would likely become less so; hence the AnCap would expect under voluntary/non-coercive market conditions a much greater distribution of "wealth" or satisfaction."}
"Nowhere and at no time has the large-scale ownership of land come into being through the working of economic forces in the market. It is the result of military and political effort. Founded by violence, it has been upheld by violence and by that alone." Ludwig von Mises
The general questions I expect we will entertain/be-focusing on are as follows:
Why might voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, have a more evenly distribution of "wealth"?
Why might voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, provide for greater "wealth" for those who might be considered to be in "poverty"?
Why might voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, be counter-productive for large-unproductive (not actively employed in processes of production/ i.e. privately owned for personal/non-productive purposes) accumulations of "wealth"?
What are the counter-arguments? Which is to say, for what reasons could we anticipate, greater concentrations of "wealth" in fewer hands?
So, in conversation with Andrew Hartwell, it occurred to me to mention the economic theory [Austrian School Economics] employed by most persons identifying themselves under the "Anarcho-Capitalist" banner would suggest that under voluntary market conditions without coercive-institutions in place, we would expect to see a more evenly distributed pattern of "wealth" or satisfaction disbursement.
Not an "Anarcho-Capitalist" myself, but as someone who is keenly interested in Austrian School economic theory, I would like to explore this thesis in discussion with others.
The following includes my original composition of the idea: {"One further note: AnCap economic theory would generally expect to see a much greater equalization of wealth [{edit}: greater disbursement of potential satisfaction, by increased production and decreased ability for coercive-capital accumulation] than we may experience today; that large capital accumulations much less likely to occur in AnCap-ism, except for specific production purposes (taking advantage of economies of scale); the indolent wealthy would be an unlikely occurrence in AnCap society, because there are no barriers to market competition, meaning the appropriation of capital away from capital-production forces for the purposes of enriching a few, would create a less competitive condition for the business that would do so, than those that would use excess capital for reinvestment in factors of production. Each voluntary transaction, having the anticipated effect of benefiting both parties, the AnCap would surmise that those currently in "poverty" would be substantially better off and those that are extraordinarily "wealthy" today would quickly find themselves less competitive under absolute free-market conditions and those "wealthy" would likely become less so; hence the AnCap would expect under voluntary/non-coercive market conditions a much greater distribution of "wealth" or satisfaction."}
"Nowhere and at no time has the large-scale ownership of land come into being through the working of economic forces in the market. It is the result of military and political effort. Founded by violence, it has been upheld by violence and by that alone." Ludwig von Mises
The general questions I expect we will entertain/be-focusing on are as follows:
Why might voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, have a more evenly distribution of "wealth"?
Why might voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, provide for greater "wealth" for those who might be considered to be in "poverty"?
Why might voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, be counter-productive for large-unproductive (not actively employed in processes of production/ i.e. privately owned for personal/non-productive purposes) accumulations of "wealth"?
What are the counter-arguments? Which is to say, for what reasons could we anticipate, greater concentrations of "wealth" in fewer hands?
+1
53 comments
First
I might like to clarify some terms, I am particularly uncomfortable
with the term "wealth" or "wealthy" & "poor" or "poverty". To a
lesser extent, we may need some clarification as well as for "capital"
(which may be used sometimes to describe liquid-assets or alternatively
to "means of production").
What is "wealth"? Is it merely money? If a person had a billion dollars, but was stuck on a deserted-island, would that person be "wealthy"? Could someone live in a 'mansion', but be in so much debt, that even if they sold their 'mansion' they would still have negative-assets, such that this person was considered "wealthy"? What about a Trappist or Buddhist monk, living a life under a vow of "poverty", yet be completely contented with almost no material possessions; would this person be "poor", or might alternatively, we say that as they consider all of their needs to be met and live a life of satisfaction & fulfillment, are they "wealthy"?
What is "wealth"? Is it merely money? If a person had a billion dollars, but was stuck on a deserted-island, would that person be "wealthy"? Could someone live in a 'mansion', but be in so much debt, that even if they sold their 'mansion' they would still have negative-assets, such that this person was considered "wealthy"? What about a Trappist or Buddhist monk, living a life under a vow of "poverty", yet be completely contented with almost no material possessions; would this person be "poor", or might alternatively, we say that as they consider all of their needs to be met and live a life of satisfaction & fulfillment, are they "wealthy"?
“There
are two types of ethically invalid land titles: “feudalism,” in which
there is continuing aggression by titleholders of land against peasants
engaged in transforming the soil; and land-engrossing, where arbitrary
claims to virgin land are used to keep first-transformers out of that
land. We may call both of these aggressions “land monopoly”–not in the
sense that some one person or group owns all the land in society, but in
the sense that arbitrary privileges to land ownership are asserted in
both cases, clashing with the libertarian rule of non-ownership of land
except by actual transformers, their heirs, and their assigns.”
–Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty
–Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty
+1
I
would also like to point out, that my thesis is NOT: "Under
voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, there will be
an /equalization/ of all 'wealth'; that is to say, that each person,
will have an equivalent 'standard of living'." My explicit thesis that I
would like to discuss here is, "Under voluntary-market conditions,
absent coercive-institutions, there will be a tendency for greater
distribution (fewer persons in 'poverty' and fewer persons who would be
extraordinarily 'rich'/'wealthy') of 'wealth' across society, than there
is currently."
Wealth is related to happiness (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=wealth)
and is created for all parties during voluntary transactions -- if
happiness isn't increased in a transaction for a party of that
transaction, that party wouldn't participate. What is only necessary is
an increase in expected happiness and the actual happiness gained in a
voluntary transaction could be negative, so technically voluntary
transactions increase the likelihood that wealth is generated much more
so than involuntary transactions.
Given the above and the law of supply and demand, we can see that as more wealth is generated in the world, purchasing power increases (ie a given amount of money can purchase more wealth as the supply of wealth increases). This is beneficial for the poor.
Given the above and the law of supply and demand, we can see that as more wealth is generated in the world, purchasing power increases (ie a given amount of money can purchase more wealth as the supply of wealth increases). This is beneficial for the poor.
In
an AC society, there can also be competition in the money-creator
market. This means that buyers and sellers aren't beholden to one
supplier of currency. As a certain number of the population start
hoarding more and more money, there'll be less circulating supply of it
and its value will increase. This will create more demand for competing
money which will decrease the value of the hoarded money. While there'll
still be rich people, they can't simply hoard the money supply. This
puts a dampening effect on the growth of the uber-rich.
@Noel Yap :
I think I'm in agreement, that in some way, "wealth" is necessarily connected with a person's ability to ameliorate their "felt uneasiness"/dissatisfaction; ie "meet their needs". In the vernacular, "wealth" is often a reference to some kind of asset-liquidity that has potential to satisfy general "needs"...
When I express the idea of, "Under voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, there would be a tendency for a greater equilibrium of 'wealth' distribution." Is, "satisfaction" an appropriate substitute for "wealth"?
I think I'm in agreement, that in some way, "wealth" is necessarily connected with a person's ability to ameliorate their "felt uneasiness"/dissatisfaction; ie "meet their needs". In the vernacular, "wealth" is often a reference to some kind of asset-liquidity that has potential to satisfy general "needs"...
When I express the idea of, "Under voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, there would be a tendency for a greater equilibrium of 'wealth' distribution." Is, "satisfaction" an appropriate substitute for "wealth"?
+Jacob S. , '+Noel Yap', not '@Noel Yap' :-) The latter has more of a chance of notifying the recipient.
I really don't like the layman definition of 'wealth' to be equated to money, liquid assets, etc. I think 'satisfaction', 'happiness', etc are better closely related semantically to 'wealth'.
I really don't like the layman definition of 'wealth' to be equated to money, liquid assets, etc. I think 'satisfaction', 'happiness', etc are better closely related semantically to 'wealth'.
+Woozle Hypertwin , to argue against AC, if he's not already in this discussion.
@
works as well as + when you type it; it gets transmogrified to + if you
select a name from the drop-down. (If you don't select, then + doesn't
work either.)
AC... Anarcho-Capitalism? Air Conditioning? Alternating Current? Analogue Computer?
AC... Anarcho-Capitalism? Air Conditioning? Alternating Current? Analogue Computer?
+Woozle Hypertwin , I thought @ was supposed to work, but made an incorrect conclusion when I saw that it didn't when Jacob addressed me.
Anarcho-Capitalism in the context of this discussion.
Anarcho-Capitalism in the context of this discussion.
{I'm on a mobile device; therefore the '@' may not have worked for that reason...}
+1
"...innumerable
statutes, dictated by the spirit of monopoly, the whole purpose of
which were [sic] to discourage industry, to concentrate trade within the
hands of few people by multiplying formalities and charges, by
subjecting industry to apprenticeships and journeymanships of ten years
in some trades which can be learned in ten days, by excluding those who
were not sons of masters, or those born outside a certain class, and by
prohibiting the employment of women in the manufacture of cloth." Tugot
Tugot's observation note the tendency for coercive-institutions to amass capital/"wealth" accumulation in fewer hands (by a variety of market-restrictions), than in more even-distributions. Barriers to trade/exchange (licenses, regulations, certifications, inspections) all result in coercive-monopolistic rent-seeking. Therefore, we would expect, under voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, that these artificial/arbitrary barriers to market-entry as well a barriers/hindrances/inefficencies to the conduct of business (those not imposed by the market itself, but by some arbitrary external source), would result in an increase in the tendency for increase in competition (more people entering the market to provide products/services), and this would increase the tendency for the market to be served by greater number of persons who do not have the economic-capacity to navigate the coercively-imposed market-barriers and would therefore result in a more even distribution of capital/"wealth"/human-needs-meeting/satisfaction.
Tugot's observation note the tendency for coercive-institutions to amass capital/"wealth" accumulation in fewer hands (by a variety of market-restrictions), than in more even-distributions. Barriers to trade/exchange (licenses, regulations, certifications, inspections) all result in coercive-monopolistic rent-seeking. Therefore, we would expect, under voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, that these artificial/arbitrary barriers to market-entry as well a barriers/hindrances/inefficencies to the conduct of business (those not imposed by the market itself, but by some arbitrary external source), would result in an increase in the tendency for increase in competition (more people entering the market to provide products/services), and this would increase the tendency for the market to be served by greater number of persons who do not have the economic-capacity to navigate the coercively-imposed market-barriers and would therefore result in a more even distribution of capital/"wealth"/human-needs-meeting/satisfaction.
+Jacob S. ,
it can be argued that increased competition can work towards increasing
poverty. As the amount of competition increases, the amount of wealth
one can make decreases. The argument against this notion is that actors
in the market can find other means to be productive.
Note also that while one may argue that increased competition can increase poverty, those who do so typically promote demand-side subsidies like government-backed low interest student loans that also increase competition. Such demand-side subsidies are insidious in that they help increase costs in the long run and, when they do, people clamor for more of it -- it's a downward (or upward if one is looking at costs) spiral.
Note also that while one may argue that increased competition can increase poverty, those who do so typically promote demand-side subsidies like government-backed low interest student loans that also increase competition. Such demand-side subsidies are insidious in that they help increase costs in the long run and, when they do, people clamor for more of it -- it's a downward (or upward if one is looking at costs) spiral.
+1
+Noel Yap
I am in agreement, that as competition increases, profit-margins must
necessarily decrease as each concern/business strives to compete with
others; this reduces the particular profit for those businesses/concerns
that were established in time of less competition, but overall, the
consumers gain by the increase in competition, because they are able to
sacrifice/pay less for goods than in less competitive conditions,
additionally, this increase in competition would increase the over-all
distribution of profits of producers/businesses into more hands, rather
than less hands. So I am in agreement that, an increase in competition
due to an expected increase in the fertility of voluntary/free-market
conditions, would reduce the potential profit for those currently
operating under coercive-institutional market conditions that create
barriers to trade which benefit them specifically, but reducing
potential for competition but the overall profit/wealth distribution
would be greater under voluntary-market conditions.
I can answer this one:
"What are the counter-arguments? Which is to say, for what reasons could we anticipate, greater concentrations of "wealth" in fewer hands?"
The obvious mechanism is that as an individual gains more wealth (be that resources, money, consumables), their ability to influence others to give up their wealth increases.
Caveat: I'm not saying that most people are naturally greedy; I don't think that is the case. It doesn't take many people behaving selfishly, however, for this mechanism to come into play.
"What are the counter-arguments? Which is to say, for what reasons could we anticipate, greater concentrations of "wealth" in fewer hands?"
The obvious mechanism is that as an individual gains more wealth (be that resources, money, consumables), their ability to influence others to give up their wealth increases.
Caveat: I'm not saying that most people are naturally greedy; I don't think that is the case. It doesn't take many people behaving selfishly, however, for this mechanism to come into play.
+Woozle Hypertwin ,
if two people are considering voluntarily transacting, why should the
fact that one party has more stored wealth (eg in the form of assets)
affect the other party's assessment of potential wealth gain? If any
such affect exists, I would think it would be the other way, that:
* the more one party has, the more the other party would want of it
* the more one party has, the less that party values it and would be willing to give it up
* the less the other party has, the less they're willing to give up
* the less the other party has, the more they would want from the other party
* the more one party has, the more the other party would want of it
* the more one party has, the less that party values it and would be willing to give it up
* the less the other party has, the less they're willing to give up
* the less the other party has, the more they would want from the other party
+1
+Woozle Hypertwin I appreciate your contribution to the discussion.
I would be in agreement, that some people have natural-ability/learned-skills that make them more competitive in the market place. These persons might be better at business negotiations, at commodity value-assessment, at marketing/salesmanship, at predicting future market conditions and reorganizing their market-placement in response to those (hopefully correct) predictions, etc. These persons would be able to increase their market-share/profitability in the competitive marketplace.
For instance a doctor or a mason might be very good at their respective vocations; their reputation in the market may mean that they have more offers for business than they could keep up with; therefore, they might choose to serve their friends or accept the highest offers for their services. These doctors or masons might have higher-profit margins as a result. But their superior-ability does not necessarily increase the accumulation of wealth into fewer hands. Their superior-ability is of benefit to their customers; their customers gain from the increase in the quality of the services that the doctor or mason could provide. But if there are no coercive-barriers to market-entry they would still have to continue to remain competitive in their respective market-places. They might have high-er profit margins, but consumers who do not need or wish to pay that level of service, may still take advantage of less-skillful providers of that respective service. Such as, if I only have a cold, and I do not need highly-specialize medical services, perhaps I would elect not to pay for the highly-qualified doctor and choose a general-practioner that offers a lower-price for service; if I only wanted a small crack in a concrete wall repaired, I might elect to pay for a less-expensive mason to repair the crack.
The barriers to market-entry imposed by coercive-institutions being removed, there would be a corresponding increase in the market-provision of products/services and consumers would have greater selection in choosing a purveyor that would meet their needs. It would seem, that although our superior-ability purveyors may have higher profit margins, within the market-place that they serve, there would still be a greater distribution of wealth/satisfaction than under coercive-market-place conditions.
Does that address your objection?
I would be in agreement, that some people have natural-ability/learned-skills that make them more competitive in the market place. These persons might be better at business negotiations, at commodity value-assessment, at marketing/salesmanship, at predicting future market conditions and reorganizing their market-placement in response to those (hopefully correct) predictions, etc. These persons would be able to increase their market-share/profitability in the competitive marketplace.
For instance a doctor or a mason might be very good at their respective vocations; their reputation in the market may mean that they have more offers for business than they could keep up with; therefore, they might choose to serve their friends or accept the highest offers for their services. These doctors or masons might have higher-profit margins as a result. But their superior-ability does not necessarily increase the accumulation of wealth into fewer hands. Their superior-ability is of benefit to their customers; their customers gain from the increase in the quality of the services that the doctor or mason could provide. But if there are no coercive-barriers to market-entry they would still have to continue to remain competitive in their respective market-places. They might have high-er profit margins, but consumers who do not need or wish to pay that level of service, may still take advantage of less-skillful providers of that respective service. Such as, if I only have a cold, and I do not need highly-specialize medical services, perhaps I would elect not to pay for the highly-qualified doctor and choose a general-practioner that offers a lower-price for service; if I only wanted a small crack in a concrete wall repaired, I might elect to pay for a less-expensive mason to repair the crack.
The barriers to market-entry imposed by coercive-institutions being removed, there would be a corresponding increase in the market-provision of products/services and consumers would have greater selection in choosing a purveyor that would meet their needs. It would seem, that although our superior-ability purveyors may have higher profit margins, within the market-place that they serve, there would still be a greater distribution of wealth/satisfaction than under coercive-market-place conditions.
Does that address your objection?
Well, +Noel Yap,
consider a situation where one party ("A") has had a crop failure
through no personal fault, and the other ("B") has spare resources.
If B is a good neighbor, s/he will happily loan A the necessary resources to get through the season and start again next year, so that A hopefully will soon work her/his way back up to a position of prosperity like that already obtained by B (and of course paying B back as soon as possible).
If, on the other hand, B sees A as a competitor, or thinks (wrongly) that A's crop failure was due to laziness, or is just a mean bastard, or for whatever reason decides to exploit A's situation, B may (for example) choose to offer A a contract in which B must pay back A's loan within a set time, with high interest, and putting up A's farm as collateral.
At this point, A must basically choose between risks: the risk of not getting the loan if s/he holds out for a better deal versus the risk of not being able to pay back the loan on time if this year isn't significantly better than the last.
Although A may be a very shrewd dealer and make the absolute best judgment call and in fact succeed in paying back B on time while still bringing in a satisfactory crop the next year, there are nonetheless two effects at work:
1. B gets richer, and A gets slightly poorer -- having lost two years of labor just to get back to where they were before the crop failure.
2. Averaged over many such incidents over different individuals in the A and B roles, there will be a certain percentage of contract failures on A's part, leaving A essentially destitute and allowing B to gain ownership of more farms -- enriching B still further, regardless of whether s/he decides to sell them to recoup the loan or keep them in production.
To answer your specific counter-suggestions:
* the more one party has, the more the other party would want of it
Yes -- but wanting is not the same thing as having. I'm not sure what you're proposing. Just because you want something a great deal doesn't grant you the means to obtain it -- no matter how hard you're willing to work (even assuming you are able).
* the more one party has, the less that party values it and would be willing to give it up
That would be nice, wouldn't it? Explain it to Citibank, ExxonMobil, Monsanto... and anyone who doesn't think that the rich should pay higher taxes.
* the less the other party has, the less they're willing to give up
The less they'd like to give up, but also the fewer choices they have if they want to survive. This is why people get into debt-spirals on credit cards.
* the less the other party has, the more they would want from the other party
Again, wanting is not the same as having.
If B is a good neighbor, s/he will happily loan A the necessary resources to get through the season and start again next year, so that A hopefully will soon work her/his way back up to a position of prosperity like that already obtained by B (and of course paying B back as soon as possible).
If, on the other hand, B sees A as a competitor, or thinks (wrongly) that A's crop failure was due to laziness, or is just a mean bastard, or for whatever reason decides to exploit A's situation, B may (for example) choose to offer A a contract in which B must pay back A's loan within a set time, with high interest, and putting up A's farm as collateral.
At this point, A must basically choose between risks: the risk of not getting the loan if s/he holds out for a better deal versus the risk of not being able to pay back the loan on time if this year isn't significantly better than the last.
Although A may be a very shrewd dealer and make the absolute best judgment call and in fact succeed in paying back B on time while still bringing in a satisfactory crop the next year, there are nonetheless two effects at work:
1. B gets richer, and A gets slightly poorer -- having lost two years of labor just to get back to where they were before the crop failure.
2. Averaged over many such incidents over different individuals in the A and B roles, there will be a certain percentage of contract failures on A's part, leaving A essentially destitute and allowing B to gain ownership of more farms -- enriching B still further, regardless of whether s/he decides to sell them to recoup the loan or keep them in production.
To answer your specific counter-suggestions:
* the more one party has, the more the other party would want of it
Yes -- but wanting is not the same thing as having. I'm not sure what you're proposing. Just because you want something a great deal doesn't grant you the means to obtain it -- no matter how hard you're willing to work (even assuming you are able).
* the more one party has, the less that party values it and would be willing to give it up
That would be nice, wouldn't it? Explain it to Citibank, ExxonMobil, Monsanto... and anyone who doesn't think that the rich should pay higher taxes.
* the less the other party has, the less they're willing to give up
The less they'd like to give up, but also the fewer choices they have if they want to survive. This is why people get into debt-spirals on credit cards.
* the less the other party has, the more they would want from the other party
Again, wanting is not the same as having.
+2
+Woozle Hypertwin
Is your hypothetical, assuming that the only available provision of
loan-services for "A" is "B"? Why would that be the case? What might be
the role of insurance-services by which "A" might insure her crops
against natural-disaster/drought/etc? While "B" might be in a position
to offer a loan to "A", unless "B" is adept at understanding the
finance/loan-marketplace, might not "B" be uncomfortable providing such a
loan? Might not "B" have more to gain by reinvesting his excess
liquid-capital into his own farm, or providing that excess capital into
the hands of perhaps, a more financially-efficient (in terms of "B's"
ability to understand financial markets and be able to make sound
investment decisions) deposit-loan service? If "B" does loan the
requisite liquid-capital to "A", is not "B" undertaking a sever risk of
loss if "A" has another failure? Wouldn't that put "B" in a very
risky/awkward financial position?
+1
+Woozle Hypertwin ,
A need not take a loan from B that'll make A worse off. Perhaps A can
take a loan from another party, C, which is better than what B will
give. If A has no other choice, A goes out of business. Sometimes luck
is part of succeeding. Perhaps A should've mitigated the risk of crop
failure, drought, etc. OTOH, if A took the risk and it paid off, A could
be in a better situation than B. This is all a part of the power of
distributed processing in free markets -- it's the same as in evolution.
A was poorer the instant there was crop failure. It has nothing to do with what B is doing. In fact, if B provided a loan, A could be in a better position than if B doesn't provide a loan. It's really up to A to decide whether or not A is better off with or without the loan. Certainly, the farther one is from A's situation, the less they know enough to make a good decision as to what A ought to do. This includes those that are willing to create legislation aimed at protecting A.
There'll be winners and losers. A could be a loser in the end. But, again, A could've been a winner had they taken the risk (of not mitigating the risk of crop failure) and it paid off.
Right, wanting isn't the same as having. Parties in a transaction will still need to come to an agreeable set of terms for that transaction.
Citibank, etc spend lots of money. Just because they don't spend it the way you want them to doesn't mean that they don't. Another example is myself. My current employer pays me much more than my previous employer. Because of that, I don't worry as much about sending my child to summer camps, getting him Lego sets and parts, etc.
Also, WRT Citibank, etc, assuming they hold in high value the amount of money they have, they would consider in the current system the ROI they would gain by using that money to influence government to steer more money towards them.
Also, there's a difference between giving and taking. IOW, Citibank, etc don't want others taking their money. They, understandably, want to be able to decide for themselves how that money is used.
The credit card problem, I think, is rooted in how the brain makes decisions. I think the more people are aware of what's happening in their own brain, the more able they are to control it, even if it's purposefully to have low limits on their credit cards.
A was poorer the instant there was crop failure. It has nothing to do with what B is doing. In fact, if B provided a loan, A could be in a better position than if B doesn't provide a loan. It's really up to A to decide whether or not A is better off with or without the loan. Certainly, the farther one is from A's situation, the less they know enough to make a good decision as to what A ought to do. This includes those that are willing to create legislation aimed at protecting A.
There'll be winners and losers. A could be a loser in the end. But, again, A could've been a winner had they taken the risk (of not mitigating the risk of crop failure) and it paid off.
Right, wanting isn't the same as having. Parties in a transaction will still need to come to an agreeable set of terms for that transaction.
Citibank, etc spend lots of money. Just because they don't spend it the way you want them to doesn't mean that they don't. Another example is myself. My current employer pays me much more than my previous employer. Because of that, I don't worry as much about sending my child to summer camps, getting him Lego sets and parts, etc.
Also, WRT Citibank, etc, assuming they hold in high value the amount of money they have, they would consider in the current system the ROI they would gain by using that money to influence government to steer more money towards them.
Also, there's a difference between giving and taking. IOW, Citibank, etc don't want others taking their money. They, understandably, want to be able to decide for themselves how that money is used.
The credit card problem, I think, is rooted in how the brain makes decisions. I think the more people are aware of what's happening in their own brain, the more able they are to control it, even if it's purposefully to have low limits on their credit cards.
+1
It
may be significant to point out, that under current conditions, the
market-place for banking/finance is /highly/ influenced by
coercive-institutions; there are monopolistic privileges given to about a
dozen of the largest banks to print money (with a little "over-sight"
but not very much; certainly not with transparent reporting), these
banks in turn, can loan out the newly created money at interest-rate
below market-rates; this inhibits other banks, who do not have that
coercive-monopolistic-privilege, from competing with
legal-counterfeiting banking-institutions (those without that privilege
actually have to have depositors). This is just the tip of the ice-berg
in terms of coercive-manipulation of banking/financial markets; I trust
this will suffice, to conclude that current financial-institutions
operate under coercive market restrictions and as such, should not
themselves be considered actions such banking/financial institutions
would take under voluntary/free market conditions. (it's beginning to
sound like we may need a separate thread on coercive-banking/finance
manipulations, as that is such a huge topic by itself...)
(Thought I had posted this earlier, but I see it's not showing up...)
"If A has no other choice, A goes out of business. Sometimes luck is part of succeeding."
That's my point. A system like this tends to amplify small misfortunes and turn them into large ones, rather than helping damp them out to minimize suffering. It's a positive feedback loop rather than a negative feedback loop.
It's like designing a car that steers further to right the closer you get to the right side of the road.
"If A has no other choice, A goes out of business. Sometimes luck is part of succeeding."
That's my point. A system like this tends to amplify small misfortunes and turn them into large ones, rather than helping damp them out to minimize suffering. It's a positive feedback loop rather than a negative feedback loop.
It's like designing a car that steers further to right the closer you get to the right side of the road.
"It
may be significant to point out, that under current conditions, the
market-place for banking/finance is /highly/ influenced by
coercive-institutions"
If the banking and finance industry hate these regulations so much, why don't they get rid of them? They own the government, and they can do whatever they want at this point.
If the banking and finance industry hate these regulations so much, why don't they get rid of them? They own the government, and they can do whatever they want at this point.
+1
+Woozle Hypertwin , it depends upon how one looks upon misfortune. Again, A had a choice of taking a risk or mitigating a risk:
* If A took a risk and it panned out, A could be better off than B.
* If A took a risk and it turned out poorly, A could be worse off than B.
* If A mitigated a risk and the event occurred, A could be better off than B.
* If A mitigated a risk and the event didn't happen, A could be worse off than B.
IIRC, there are actually weather options that A could buy to mitigate risk. Insurance is a form of option.
I think there's a love-hate relationship with regulations. Regulations help raise the barrier to competitors. If I were a bank, I would look at the ROI of specific regulations to valuate whether or not I would oppose them.
* If A took a risk and it panned out, A could be better off than B.
* If A took a risk and it turned out poorly, A could be worse off than B.
* If A mitigated a risk and the event occurred, A could be better off than B.
* If A mitigated a risk and the event didn't happen, A could be worse off than B.
IIRC, there are actually weather options that A could buy to mitigate risk. Insurance is a form of option.
I think there's a love-hate relationship with regulations. Regulations help raise the barrier to competitors. If I were a bank, I would look at the ROI of specific regulations to valuate whether or not I would oppose them.
+1
+John Hummel , as someone else who might oppose anarcho-capitalism, if he's not already in this discussion.
I see all of your scenarios, but on the average the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Yes, insurance can help mitigate the difference -- if you can afford it.
Again, someone who has resources can afford to buy services to protect
those resources and themselves; someone who doesn't have sufficient
resources may be SOL.
+1
+Woozle Hypertwin ,
I agree. And in a non-AC world, it's even worse since those with the
resources can influence government, who is granted the power to take
resources from others, to redirect those resources towards themselves.
Yes, the rich can get richer, but, again, if it gets out of hand, the masses will start using a different currency thereby decreasing the value of the currency held by the uber-rich. No such option exists in a non-AC world.
Also, again, the poor don't get poorer since their purchasing power increases. Remember, it's free market economics that made cell phones affordable to homeless people in India and Kenya. Also note all the free services (you're using one right now) available today and how cheap it is to get information.
Yes, the rich can get richer, but, again, if it gets out of hand, the masses will start using a different currency thereby decreasing the value of the currency held by the uber-rich. No such option exists in a non-AC world.
Also, again, the poor don't get poorer since their purchasing power increases. Remember, it's free market economics that made cell phones affordable to homeless people in India and Kenya. Also note all the free services (you're using one right now) available today and how cheap it is to get information.
" And
in a non-AC world, it's even worse since those with the resources can
influence government, who is granted the power to take resources from
others, to redirect those resources towards themselves."
On the other hand, government -- when it's functioning properly -- helps to even out the spread, and make sure everyone is treated fairly.
Admittedly it fails terribly at that when it is taken over by powerful interests.
Are we in agreement that this is the basic problem-space (or one fairly simple representation of it), and (more importantly) the only solution is going to involve a new system that significantly different from either AC or what we have now?
On the other hand, government -- when it's functioning properly -- helps to even out the spread, and make sure everyone is treated fairly.
Admittedly it fails terribly at that when it is taken over by powerful interests.
Are we in agreement that this is the basic problem-space (or one fairly simple representation of it), and (more importantly) the only solution is going to involve a new system that significantly different from either AC or what we have now?
+1
+Woozle Hypertwin , government functioning properly is a big
if. Let's analyze that, though. Government lowers the barrier for
aggression. Initiating force via a third-party is easier than initiating
force oneself. This is seen in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem. Since the cost of aggressing and initiating force is now lower, there'll be more demand for it. This is essentially http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jevons_paradox.
But not everyone will have equal access to the state. Instead, in practice, some will have more influence than others. This means that those with the most influence will gain the most benefits and do so at the expense of those with less influence.
IOW, it will always be taken over by powerful interests. Note that this includes corporations, unions, special interest groups, etc.
I think the way to solve this is through competition. Allow other entities to provide the services (including protection) afforded by the current state.
I agree that the monopoly the state has on power and authority is the central problem.
It's strange that we agree on essentially everything yet disagree on the AC solution. This makes me think that we may differ on our definition and or image of AC.
But not everyone will have equal access to the state. Instead, in practice, some will have more influence than others. This means that those with the most influence will gain the most benefits and do so at the expense of those with less influence.
IOW, it will always be taken over by powerful interests. Note that this includes corporations, unions, special interest groups, etc.
I think the way to solve this is through competition. Allow other entities to provide the services (including protection) afforded by the current state.
I agree that the monopoly the state has on power and authority is the central problem.
It's strange that we agree on essentially everything yet disagree on the AC solution. This makes me think that we may differ on our definition and or image of AC.
Again,
you're arguing that because a tool exists that makes it easier to do
bad things, people will naturally do bad things with it, and therefore
the tool itself is bad.
+1
What
if the "tool" analogy is inappropriate/not-applicable? What if
"government" is not analogous to a "tool" but "government" is analogous
to "slavery"? If such was the case, then it wouldn't matter how "good" a
person's intentions may be, "slavery" would still remain an
ethical-pariah.
+1
But
whether "government" is essentially a coercive-institution supported by
extortion is off the topic that I would prefer to discuss in this
thread.
Would we expect to find greater or lesser distribution of satisfaction/"wealth" under conditions of voluntary-exchange-markets, absent coercive-institutions?
Would we expect to find greater or lesser distribution of satisfaction/"wealth" under conditions of voluntary-exchange-markets, absent coercive-institutions?
+1
+Woozle Hypertwin ,
the tool makes it easy to do bad things, yes. Those that are more apt
to leave others alone won't use the tool as much as those that will
impose their beliefs upon others.
In theory, the state works. But the difference between theory and practice is that in theory, theory and practice are the same while in practice, they're not.
In theory, the state works. But the difference between theory and practice is that in theory, theory and practice are the same while in practice, they're not.
+2
+Jacob S. ,
considering that those that would use influence over the state would do
so to redirect money taken by the state towards themselves, I don't see
how there would be a greater wealth distribution with the state than
without the state unless the state was very socialist.
Having said that, I think there's a healthy amount of wealth distribution such that an extremely skewed distribution is unhealthy and an extremely flat distribution is also unhealthy. What that distribution ought to be, I don't know, but would imagine depended upon the economic environment (meaning it would be dynamic). Unless it's through sheer luck, a state cannot hit this ideal distribution since it's not omniscient and it's impossible for it to control everything.
Having said that, I think there's a healthy amount of wealth distribution such that an extremely skewed distribution is unhealthy and an extremely flat distribution is also unhealthy. What that distribution ought to be, I don't know, but would imagine depended upon the economic environment (meaning it would be dynamic). Unless it's through sheer luck, a state cannot hit this ideal distribution since it's not omniscient and it's impossible for it to control everything.
"What if "government" is not analogous to a "tool" but "government" is analogous to "slavery"?"
In that alternate reality, sure -- it would be bad. But we're talking about this reality.
Or are you using the anarchist definition of "government", in which it is definitionally coercive and hierarchical? I'm talking about the broader definition (I think Noel prefers the word "governance" for this; I find that confusing, but I'll try to use it if it pushes the right buttons for others.) in which it is a system for maximizing shared benefits.
In that alternate reality, sure -- it would be bad. But we're talking about this reality.
Or are you using the anarchist definition of "government", in which it is definitionally coercive and hierarchical? I'm talking about the broader definition (I think Noel prefers the word "governance" for this; I find that confusing, but I'll try to use it if it pushes the right buttons for others.) in which it is a system for maximizing shared benefits.
"the
tool makes it easy to do bad things, yes. Those that are more apt to
leave others alone won't use the tool as much as those that will impose
their beliefs upon others."
So... we should ban handguns?
So... we should ban handguns?
I
think we should use 'governance' for non-coercive and 'state' to avoid
ambiguity. I know I've been sloppy with this and will try to stick to
these terms.
+1
+Woozle Hypertwin
, I know a bunch of people with guns that wouldn't use it for
aggression. The equivalent to making guns available to everyone is to
make governance available to everyone such that a state doesn't have a
monopoly on authority, protection services, etc.
The problem with banning guns is that those that would use them to aggress wouldn't adhere to the ban. In fact, we see this with states when they make exceptions for themselves (eg allowing themselves to kidnap, steal, kill, etc).
I remember the difference between our beliefs that lead us to different conclusions. I have accepted that property rights solve many of the issues. You haven't accepted that which is fine so long as you keep searching for a workable alternative. FWIW, there are still issues with property rights I'm still trying to square away.
The problem with banning guns is that those that would use them to aggress wouldn't adhere to the ban. In fact, we see this with states when they make exceptions for themselves (eg allowing themselves to kidnap, steal, kill, etc).
I remember the difference between our beliefs that lead us to different conclusions. I have accepted that property rights solve many of the issues. You haven't accepted that which is fine so long as you keep searching for a workable alternative. FWIW, there are still issues with property rights I'm still trying to square away.
+1
I
know a lot of people who wouldn't use governance oppressively or
coercively. Can we agree that governance isn't automatically bad?
+3
I
generally rely on the term "State" to refer to that institution which
is necessarily a violent/coercive/expropriating institutional monopoly
making claims of its own self-legitimacy within its claimed geographical
area. In the vernacular, "government" is essentially synonymous with
the "State", however, I would concede that its technical meaning, does
not necessarily imply an institution of domination, I would point out
that it certainly is possible, for a "government" (or "governance" for
that matter, for "governance" refers to merely to "act" of governing...)
to be an institution of domination, and indeed, more than possible,
nearly every organization which the average person might point to as a
"government" is likely to be an institution of domination (not many
people would point to voluntary social/business organizations and make
the connections that those are "governments" of their own sort...).
Does this "thing", whether we call it one thing or the other, assume to be able to make "rules" for other people, does it then make coercive-threats of "punishment" against those who would "disobey" those rules? Does this "thing" presume to extend its dominion, past those individuals who voluntarily participate in it, and extend that dominion on people who would rather be left alone? If this institution, as a regular course of business, indeed as an essential course of business, enforces its will upon unwilling/non-consenting persons, if it engages in the initiation of force, coercion or expropriation, that institution is necessarily ethically irredeemable. This institution is sociopathy which has been institutionalized; it is a cancer to all who willingly participate a poison for those who are dominated by that institution.
I hope that would clarify my position, in the least. :-)
Does this "thing", whether we call it one thing or the other, assume to be able to make "rules" for other people, does it then make coercive-threats of "punishment" against those who would "disobey" those rules? Does this "thing" presume to extend its dominion, past those individuals who voluntarily participate in it, and extend that dominion on people who would rather be left alone? If this institution, as a regular course of business, indeed as an essential course of business, enforces its will upon unwilling/non-consenting persons, if it engages in the initiation of force, coercion or expropriation, that institution is necessarily ethically irredeemable. This institution is sociopathy which has been institutionalized; it is a cancer to all who willingly participate a poison for those who are dominated by that institution.
I hope that would clarify my position, in the least. :-)
Your terminology makes more sense to me, +Jacob S.
In response to your second paragraph, I am trying to find solutions that do not inflict force on those who have not consented to participate. All of my proposed solutions are compatible with that restriction.
That said, I don't know if any such solution can be found that is workable, because those who are willing to use force against others have a natural advantage, and their ideologies are therefore more likely to prevail.
I think of political systems as being like organisms competing in the wild -- we have to come up with something that is more adaptive than force/violence, or it will be "out-competed" by systems that use those methods.
My best estimation is that this is entirely possible but nontrivial.
In response to your second paragraph, I am trying to find solutions that do not inflict force on those who have not consented to participate. All of my proposed solutions are compatible with that restriction.
That said, I don't know if any such solution can be found that is workable, because those who are willing to use force against others have a natural advantage, and their ideologies are therefore more likely to prevail.
I think of political systems as being like organisms competing in the wild -- we have to come up with something that is more adaptive than force/violence, or it will be "out-competed" by systems that use those methods.
My best estimation is that this is entirely possible but nontrivial.
+Jacob S. ,
there are grey areas WRT a governance enforcing its will upon others.
For example, let's say a member of governance A kills someone of
governance B. Both A and B hold that killing another is illegal but they
disagree on punishment. A holds that capital punishment is OK while B
does not. Law without Government: The Bargaining Mechanism has a good solution to this scenario.
+2
+Woozle Hypertwin , it's not the use of force per se that is wrong; it's the initiation
of force -- aggression. Use of force for defense is perfectly OK.
Moreover, I think the vast majority of people wouldn't aggress upon
others -- how many people in the US would voluntarily support the wars
its waging today across the seas? So, those that would aggress would be
outnumbered by those that wouldn't; the former wouldn't have the upper
hand.
I think voluntary transactions, in that they likely create wealth for all parties involved, are better and more adaptive than systems that use force/violence. Note that, just is in evolution, adaptive systems allow individuals to make mistakes and fail. Hmm, it just occurred to me that such systems are actually more biased towards system sustainability than individual sustainability, at least more so than socialist systems that purport to be.
I think voluntary transactions, in that they likely create wealth for all parties involved, are better and more adaptive than systems that use force/violence. Note that, just is in evolution, adaptive systems allow individuals to make mistakes and fail. Hmm, it just occurred to me that such systems are actually more biased towards system sustainability than individual sustainability, at least more so than socialist systems that purport to be.
Any thoughts on this? -- http://dev.republicoftheunitedstates.org/what-is-the-republic/
A GOP State Senate candidate has quit the official race and joined them: http://2012.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/07/republic-of-the-united-states-of-america-united-states-corporation-randi-johnson.php
I think this is actually a good idea, but I bet they're going about it with Reality Warp Factor set to eleven...
A GOP State Senate candidate has quit the official race and joined them: http://2012.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/07/republic-of-the-united-states-of-america-united-states-corporation-randi-johnson.php
I think this is actually a good idea, but I bet they're going about it with Reality Warp Factor set to eleven...
+1
+Woozle Hypertwin ,
I think it's great there's a movement like the Republic for the united
States of America. Obviously, it's hard to predict how it'll turn out
except that, if it still uses aggression, it'll eventually grow into
something like what we have today.
+1
+Woozle Hypertwin
When I reflect upon (and confirmed by observations) the nature of
voluntary interactions, I see both parties interacting because they both
see some mutual benefit for themselves; in violent/coercive
interactions take place, only one party (the one using
violence/force/coercion) benefits, leaving the coerced person much worse
off. This to me suggests not only an ethical principle, but a
principle for greater human-satisfaction/need-meeting; voluntary
interactions are more competitive, because there is a net gain to be had
by all parties.
Most of us spent our childhoods under domination/subjugation. This kind of treatment can lead to emotional scarring; since we were treated unfairly, sometimes we may wish to "hold the reigns of power" so that we will no longer be dominated/subjugated; I think this is the essence of politics. Many people, because they have lived lives under domination, all struggling to grasp/hold the means/institutions of domination, so that their needs, and those of their fellows can be met (cognitive dissonance created by those emotional scars makes it had to empathize with the unmet needs of others, as they seek to be the dominators, therefore they think that they are doing the 'good'; that the world would be better off if they were the ones possessing the means/institutions of coercion/domination, than if the 'other' team were to hold those reigns).
The political means, nay, any means of domination, is always a net loss for everyone. While the thief may rob the pharmacy and feel as though he is made better off by the theft; the theft leads to higher insurance premiums to all around, and/or it leads to a sever loss of that pharmacist to provide the medicines for the thieve's ailing mother... Though the consequences/repercussions make be far removed, and those costs externalized to many others, the world as a whole is less well off, in terms of the capacity of human-satisfaction/needs-meeting than if violence/coercion/expropriation had not occurred.
Because some of us have have been dominated/subjugated, we wish to transfer/externalize those buried emotional scars, upon others. I wonder that if the crux of the problem is a lack of empathy (a lack of self-empathy for one's own pains/unmet-needs, and a lack of empathy for the pain/unmet-needs of others), I wonder if the ultimate solution of these social problems might be solved by an increase in social-empathy. What if people, were to be more self-reflective regarding their own emotional/physical/social needs? What if the healing that could take by just a few people, in touch with what is most-human inside of themselves, living lives in authenticity/empathy with their feelings and needs, could begin the process of extending that empathy outward, helping to heal others? What if a cohort of children were then raised without parental or institutional, domination/subjugation? Could the world possibly be transformed by voluntary interactions and the healing of a cohort of children who feel no need to dominate/subjugate others, because they have never known domination or subjugation? Could the world be transformed by an understanding/connection with one's prior pains/emotional-scars, and begin a process in which no one wished to take over the means/institutions of domination, because they are to busy living lives of empathic connection to their own feelings/needs and are living in voluntary social arrangements with others?
Most of us spent our childhoods under domination/subjugation. This kind of treatment can lead to emotional scarring; since we were treated unfairly, sometimes we may wish to "hold the reigns of power" so that we will no longer be dominated/subjugated; I think this is the essence of politics. Many people, because they have lived lives under domination, all struggling to grasp/hold the means/institutions of domination, so that their needs, and those of their fellows can be met (cognitive dissonance created by those emotional scars makes it had to empathize with the unmet needs of others, as they seek to be the dominators, therefore they think that they are doing the 'good'; that the world would be better off if they were the ones possessing the means/institutions of coercion/domination, than if the 'other' team were to hold those reigns).
The political means, nay, any means of domination, is always a net loss for everyone. While the thief may rob the pharmacy and feel as though he is made better off by the theft; the theft leads to higher insurance premiums to all around, and/or it leads to a sever loss of that pharmacist to provide the medicines for the thieve's ailing mother... Though the consequences/repercussions make be far removed, and those costs externalized to many others, the world as a whole is less well off, in terms of the capacity of human-satisfaction/needs-meeting than if violence/coercion/expropriation had not occurred.
Because some of us have have been dominated/subjugated, we wish to transfer/externalize those buried emotional scars, upon others. I wonder that if the crux of the problem is a lack of empathy (a lack of self-empathy for one's own pains/unmet-needs, and a lack of empathy for the pain/unmet-needs of others), I wonder if the ultimate solution of these social problems might be solved by an increase in social-empathy. What if people, were to be more self-reflective regarding their own emotional/physical/social needs? What if the healing that could take by just a few people, in touch with what is most-human inside of themselves, living lives in authenticity/empathy with their feelings and needs, could begin the process of extending that empathy outward, helping to heal others? What if a cohort of children were then raised without parental or institutional, domination/subjugation? Could the world possibly be transformed by voluntary interactions and the healing of a cohort of children who feel no need to dominate/subjugate others, because they have never known domination or subjugation? Could the world be transformed by an understanding/connection with one's prior pains/emotional-scars, and begin a process in which no one wished to take over the means/institutions of domination, because they are to busy living lives of empathic connection to their own feelings/needs and are living in voluntary social arrangements with others?
+Jacob S. -
I think you have put your finger on one of the characteristics that
distinguish authoritarians from non-authoritarians. Have you read theauthoritarians.com?
+Scott Swain Did you have any additional concerns regarding wealth distribution under voluntary market conditions?
First I might like to clarify some terms, I am particularly uncomfortable with the term "wealth" or "wealthy" & "poor" or "poverty". To a lesser extent, we may need some clarification as well as for "capital" (which may be used sometimes to describe liquid-assets or alternatively to "means of production").
ReplyDeleteWhat is "wealth"? Is it merely money? If a person had a billion dollars, but was stuck on a deserted-island, would that person be "wealthy"? Could someone live in a 'mansion', but be in so much debt, that even if they sold their 'mansion' they would still have negative-assets, such that this person was considered "wealthy"? What about a Trappist or Buddhist monk, living a life under a vow of "poverty", yet be completely contented with almost no material possessions; would this person be "poor", or might alternatively, we say that as they consider all of their needs to be met and live a life of satisfaction & fulfillment, are they "wealthy"?
I would also like to point out, that my thesis is NOT: "Under voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, there will be an /equalization/ of all 'wealth'; that is to say, that each person, will have an equivalent 'standard of living'." My explicit thesis that I would like to discuss here is, "Under voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, there will be a tendency for greater distribution (fewer persons in 'poverty' and fewer persons who would be extraordinarily 'rich'/'wealthy') of 'wealth' across society, than there is currently."
ReplyDelete“There are two types of ethically invalid land titles: “feudalism,” in which there is continuing aggression by titleholders of land against peasants engaged in transforming the soil; and land-engrossing, where arbitrary claims to virgin land are used to keep first-transformers out of that land. We may call both of these aggressions “land monopoly”–not in the sense that some one person or group owns all the land in society, but in the sense that arbitrary privileges to land ownership are asserted in both cases, clashing with the libertarian rule of non-ownership of land except by actual transformers, their heirs, and their assigns.”
ReplyDelete–Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty
http://darjeelingzen.blogspot.com/2012/07/franz-oppenheimer-state.html
ReplyDelete"...innumerable statutes, dictated by the spirit of monopoly, the whole purpose of which were [sic] to discourage industry, to concentrate trade within the hands of few people by multiplying formalities and charges, by subjecting industry to apprenticeships and journeymanships of ten years in some trades which can be learned in ten days, by excluding those who were not sons of masters, or those born outside a certain class, and by prohibiting the employment of women in the manufacture of cloth." Tugot
ReplyDeleteTugot's observation note the tendency for coercive-institutions to amass capital/"wealth" accumulation in fewer hands (by a variety of market-restrictions), than in more even-distributions. Barriers to trade/exchange (licenses, regulations, certifications, inspections) all result in coercive-monopolistic rent-seeking. Therefore, we would expect, under voluntary-market conditions, absent coercive-institutions, that these artificial/arbitrary barriers to market-entry as well a barriers/hindrances/inefficiencies to the conduct of business (those not imposed by the market itself, but by some arbitrary external source), would result in an increase in the tendency for increase in competition (more people entering the market to provide products/services), and this would increase the tendency for the market to be served by greater number of persons who do not have the economic-capacity to navigate the coercively-imposed market-barriers and would therefore result in a more even distribution of capital/"wealth"/human-needs-meeting/satisfaction.
Noel Yap replied: "it can be argued that increased competition can work towards increasing poverty. As the amount of competition increases, the amount of wealth one can make decreases."
ReplyDeleteMy response: I am in agreement, that as competition increases, profit-margins must necessarily decrease as each concern/business strives to compete with others; this reduces the particular profit for those businesses/concerns that were established in time of less competition, but overall, the consumers gain by the increase in competition, because they are able to sacrifice/pay less for goods than in less competitive conditions, additionally, this increase in competition would increase the over-all distribution of profits of producers/businesses into more hands, rather than less hands. So I am in agreement that, an increase in competition due to an expected increase in the fertility of voluntary/free-market conditions, would reduce the potential profit for those currently operating under coercive-institutional market conditions that create barriers to trade which benefit them specifically, but reducing potential for competition but the overall profit/wealth distribution would be greater under voluntary-market conditions.
+Woozle Hypertwin commented: "The obvious mechanism is that as an individual gains more wealth (be that resources, money, consumables), their ability to influence others to give up their wealth increases. [Caveat: I'm not saying that most people are naturally greedy; I don't think that is the case. It doesn't take many people behaving selfishly, however, for this mechanism to come into play.]"
ReplyDeleteMy response:
I appreciate your contribution to the discussion.
I would be in agreement, that some people have natural-ability/learned-skills that make them more competitive in the market place. These persons might be better at business negotiations, at commodity value-assessment, at marketing/salesmanship, at predicting future market conditions and reorganizing their market-placement in response to those (hopefully correct) predictions, etc. These persons would be able to increase their market-share/profitability in the competitive marketplace.
For instance a doctor or a mason might be very good at their respective vocations; their reputation in the market may mean that they have more offers for business than they could keep up with; therefore, they might choose to serve their friends or accept the highest offers for their services. These doctors or masons might have higher-profit margins as a result. But their superior-ability does not necessarily increase the accumulation of wealth into fewer hands. Their superior-ability is of benefit to their customers; their customers gain from the increase in the quality of the services that the doctor or mason could provide. But if there are no coercive-barriers to market-entry they would still have to continue to remain competitive in their respective market-places. They might have high-er profit margins, but consumers who do not need or wish to pay that level of service, may still take advantage of less-skillful providers of that respective service. Such as, if I only have a cold, and I do not need highly-specialize medical services, perhaps I would elect not to pay for the highly-qualified doctor and choose a general-practioner that offers a lower-price for service; if I only wanted a small crack in a concrete wall repaired, I might elect to pay for a less-expensive mason to repair the crack.
The barriers to market-entry imposed by coercive-institutions being removed, there would be a corresponding increase in the market-provision of products/services and consumers would have greater selection in choosing a purveyor that would meet their needs. It would seem, that although our superior-ability purveyors may have higher profit margins, within the market-place that they serve, there would still be a greater distribution of wealth/satisfaction than under coercive-market-place conditions.
Does that address your objection?
It may be significant to point out, that under current conditions, the market-place for banking/finance is /highly/ influenced by coercive-institutions; there are monopolistic privileges given to about a dozen of the largest banks to print money (with a little "over-sight" but not very much; certainly not with transparent reporting), these banks in turn, can loan out the newly created money at interest-rate below market-rates; this inhibits other banks, who do not have that coercive-monopolistic-privilege, from competing with legal-counterfeiting banking-institutions (those without that privilege actually have to have depositors). This is just the tip of the ice-berg in terms of coercive-manipulation of banking/financial markets; I trust this will suffice, to conclude that current financial-institutions operate under coercive market restrictions and as such, should not themselves be considered actions such banking/financial institutions would take under voluntary/free market conditions. (it's beginning to sound like we may need a separate thread on coercive-banking/finance manipulations, as that is such a huge topic by itself...)
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